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51 Introduction
The Clingendael Monitor 2015 points to continuing destabilisation in the Middle East and 
North Africa (MENA). However the specific geographical reference to North Africa is 
no longer applicable. The zone of instability has spread to the Sahel and sub-Saharan 
Africa. Tensions also remain elsewhere on the African continent (in the Great Lakes 
states, for example), often related to past conflicts.
Instability and conflict in Africa create a range of security problems for Europe. Rapidly 
increasing migration via the Mediterranean Sea, extremism and terrorism, as well as 
cross-border crime, all have implications for security in Europe, but are spill-over effects 
of instability outside Europe. Europe’s external and internal security are thus interrelated. 
European economic interests are also affected by disruption to the availability of natural 
resources and raw materials, and trading relations are threatened. Demographic trends 
– Africa has the world’s fastest-growing population – and the lack of any prospect of 
economic progress in some African countries, suggest that the pressure of migration 
towards Europe will persist. The European Union (EU) has a considerable interest in a 
stable Africa, and also seems willing to assume a special responsibility for the continent.
In her ‘state of the world’ assessment in June 2015, EU High Representative Federica 
Mogherini discusses challenges and opportunities for Europe. About North Africa she 
notes: “We need to respond to old and new conflicts, and help address the root causes 
of resentment through tailor-made responses.” The EU can help in unlocking Africa’s 
potential “by developing the right mix of migration and mobility policies; by bolstering 
security cooperation with the United Nations, the African Union and other African 
partners; and by bridging fair trade and economic integration objectives.”1 Following this 
assessment report, the European Council mandated the High Representative to develop 
a broad common foreign and security strategy. This must be presented to the European 
Council by June 2016. Naturally the new strategy is driven by changing security 
conditions, and in particular by the increasing instability in the vicinity of the European 
Union. At the same time, the foreign and security strategy is consistent with the fifth 
priority of the EU’s strategic agenda: the EU as a strong global player. Reinforcing the 
EU’s role on the world stage flows from this priority, which will be an important theme 
during the Dutch EU Presidency (in the first half of 2016).
1 The European Union in a changing global environment – A more connected, contested and complex world, 
European External Action Service, 2015, p.2
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Given Africa’s particular significance for Europe, it is expected to receive close attention 
in the new strategy. At the same time, the EU continues to deploy its range of different 
policy instruments on a daily basis. The strategy’s primary aim is to bring these together 
in an integrated or ‘joined-up’ approach, according to Mogherini.
This Clingendael report focuses on trend analysis of the European Union’s role as 
a security actor in Africa. It considers the use of all the policy instruments at the 
EU’s disposal, from development cooperation to crisis management and countering 
extremism. In principle the EU has an integrated approach, although this often seems 
difficult to achieve in practice. This study concentrates mainly on how the integrated 
approach is evolving, and what consequences this has for the Common Security and 
Defence Policy (CSDP). The geographic emphasis will be on North Africa, the Sahel and 
sub-Saharan Africa.
The report is structured as follows. Chapter 2 outlines the trends in instability and 
conflict in Africa. What are the determining factors? What characteristics can be 
distinguished? What challenges do the conflicts in Africa present for Europe? This 
chapter ties in closely with the Strategic Monitor 2015, but offers a more in-depth 
analysis for Africa. Chapter 3 addresses the EU’s broad approach as a security actor 
in Africa. What policy instruments does the Union use, and what developments can be 
identified in this respect? What is the status of the coordination between the various 
actors and instruments? What priority trends are discernible, both geographically and in 
the choice of instruments? How well is supporting and strengthening African regional 
organisations progressing? Chapter 4 then analyses trends involving the EU’s specific 
crisis management instrument, the CSDP. What developments have characterised 
recent CSDP operations and missions in Africa? What consequences do trends in 
African conflicts have for crisis management and the capacities to be deployed? What 
consequences does the integrated approach entail for the CSDP, including coordination 
with internal security actors? What does all this mean for the member states’ military 
and civilian capabilities? Chapter 5 sets out the conclusions from the previous three 
chapters. The report makes no recommendations. As an in-depth study in connection 
with the Clingendael Monitor 2016, it focuses on exploring and analysing trends.
72  Africa as a continent 
of conflict
 Hans Hoebeke
Africa continues to be the most unstable continent, although this fact is overshadowed 
by the burgeoning crisis in the Middle East. The struggle for political legitimacy, control 
of the state and access to economic power are the main causes of armed conflict. 
Despite an increase in the number of ‘democratic’ elections, power structures remain 
largely centralised and patrimonial. Elections are a zero-sum game. In addition, the fault 
lines in many states are based predominantly on identity: regional, ethnic or religious. 
The recent example of Burkina Faso also showed that coups (or attempted coups) 
are still part of the political toolkit.2 Political instability can quickly arise in countries 
previously defined as democratic, as Mali’s example showed.3 After a coup against an 
extremely corrupt and inefficient regime, the country faced regional/ethnic conflicts, 
followed by an organised attempt to take power by a terrorist network operating at the 
regional level. The NATO intervention in Libya (2011) led to chaos in that country, with a 
knock-on effect on the Sahel countries, partly as a result of the spread of weapons. The 
general picture on the continent is troubling. The most recent edition of the Mo Ibrahim 
Index indicates that even the performance of many of the brighter students in the class 
is highly questionable; at best, stagnation appears to be occurring.4
A large group of states in the Horn of Africa, Central Africa and West Africa seems 
unable to make the transition from violent conflict to the construction of minimal 
stability. This group includes Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Burundi, the Central African 
Republic (CAR), the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Guinea-Bissau and Mali. In 
all these countries, the population regards the state primarily as a problem or even as 
the enemy. Underdevelopment, patrimonial state structures, highly fragmented societies, 
regional factors and demographics are among the potent mix of root causes of conflict. 
International actors seek the fastest possible exit, and focus their attention mainly on 
their own security interests, such as counter-terrorism, migration control and, since the 
2 In the past decade, coups or attempted coups have occurred in Mauritania (2005, 2008), Guinea (2008), 
Madagascar (2009), Niger (2010), Mali (2012), Guinea-Bissau (2012), the Central African Republic (2013) 
and Burundi (2015). 
3 It remains to be seen whether the lessons of the past will be applied. For instance, the relationship between 
the Malian government and the north of the country remains difficult. Lauren Bigot, ‘Permis de tuer au 
Sahel’, Le Monde, 2 Novembre 2015.
4 Ibrahim Index of African Governance 2015, Mo Ibrahim Foundation, London, October 2015
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Ebola epidemic, the containment of international health crises. After a brief transitional 
period, elections are quickly resorted to as a way out of protracted and complex crises. 
The government then simply gets down to everyday business, without any broader effort 
to tackle the root causes. The World Development Report of 2011 indicated that the 
required transformation takes many decades.5
International involvement is also characterised by increasing complexity. This 
applies both to non-African actions (by the UN, the EU and individual states) and 
to African involvement. The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) has become the 
more interventionist African Union (AU). In addition, the importance of the regional 
(economic) communities such as SADC, CEEAC, ECOWAS, IGAD and others has 
increased.6 Together with the AU, they form a complex, overlapping and competing 
constellation of international African organisations. Both international and African 
parties turn to this market of potential actors for assistance and support. As already 
indicated, external interventions are focusing increasingly on tackling religious 
radicalisation and terrorism, phenomena to which sub-Saharan Africa (apart from 
Somalia) was previously considered largely immune. In recent years, they have become 
increasingly common in East and West Africa in particular, including the use of suicide 
bombers.7 However, this is primarily a phenomenon developing on the back of existing 
conflicts and in states with weak political legitimacy.
Religious radicalisation and terrorism
An increase in religious radicalisation has been clearly apparent in sub-Saharan Africa 
over the past decade. North Africa has long contended with this problem. During the 
nineties, Algeria experienced a bloody civil war between the secular state and religious 
groups. The need to keep radical tendencies under control was a crucial argument used 
by the authoritarian regimes that were forced out during the ‘Arab Spring’, and is once 
again of central importance now that the entire region is affected by political violence. 
This radicalisation dynamic has become firmly established in the Sahel region with its 
extremely weak states, using former trade routes. Radicalisation in sub-Saharan Africa 
is a complex problem, with a mix of political, social and economic causes forming a rich 
5 World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development, World Bank, Washington, 2011, p. 51.
6 SADC: Southern African Development Community; CEEAC: Communauté Economique des Etats de l’Afrique 
Centrale ; ECOWAS: Economic Community of West African States; IGAD: Intergovernmental Authority on 
Development
7 Nigeria was the African country most affected in 2014, according to figures from the US State Department. 
In 2015, a significant increase has been observed in Chad and Cameroon, and previously also in Kenya and 
Somalia.
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potential breeding-ground, with distinctive national and regional features in the various 
places.8
Because of their direct association with political violence and terrorism, and the link with 
transnational networks such as Islamic State (ISIS) and al-Qaeda, movements such as 
AQIM9, Boko Haram10 and al-Shabaab attract a great deal of (international) attention. 
A comparable phenomenon, currently less violent but equally relevant politically, is the 
spectacular rise of a range of new Christian churches.11 In both cases, the breeding-
ground lies to a large degree in the opposition to the established order by mainly young 
people, often fairly well educated. The evangelical churches and radical Islamic (often 
Wahhabist) groups offer a new social structure and purpose for a very young population 
with little or no opportunity for social and economic development.12 Increasing 
urbanisation is also associated with radicalisation.
The influence of the evangelical churches and movements has been expressed 
powerfully in social and ethical debates – recently for example with regard to 
homosexuality in Uganda. Often, these churches and movements have no access to 
existing platforms for dialogue between government and religious groups, or can only 
gain such access with difficulty. This even applies to the Pentecostal churches that do 
have access to political power in Kenya and Uganda.13 The established religious elites 
are reluctant to allow competition, but in large cities such as Kinshasa in the DRC, 
support for, and the importance of, the new Christian movements are increasingly 
overshadowing the established Catholic Church. These churches, with pastors seeking 
affiliation with political groups as a form of patronage, offer more scope for autocratic 
regimes to manipulate public debate. Another characteristic shared by the Christian 
and Islamic movements is their close financial and other ties with foreign actors. In the 
case of the Wahhabist movements, the main foreign backer is Saudi Arabia, but Qatar is 
also an important source of financial support. For the Christian movements, support and 
inspiration often come from the United States and, increasingly, Nigeria.
8 Guido Steinberg, Annette Weber, Jihadism in Africa – Local causes, regional expansion, international 
alliances, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Berlin, 2015. Thus Al-Shabaab in Kenya has found fertile 
ground in the coastal region and among the ethnic Somali, who have experienced a high level of political 
frustration with the Kenyan state for decades; similar frustrations also exist in Ethiopia among structurally 
under-represented and underdeveloped populations.
9 Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.
10 Since its affiliation with ISIS in 2015 the group has adopted the name Wilayat al Sudan al Gharbi. 
11 Cameroon: The Threat of Religious Radicalism, International Crisis Group, Brussels, September 2015, p.10
12 A. Botha, M. Abdile, Radicalisation and al-Shabaab recruitment in Somalia, Institute for Security tudies, 
Pretoria, 2014
13 Jennifer G. Cooke, Richard Downie, Religious Authority and the State in Africa, Centre for Strategic and 
International Studies, Washington, 2015, p. 29
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The use of violence in Africa
Futures analyses point to continued instability in many parts of Africa. The area of 
the Sahel and sub-Saharan Africa in particular has become a breeding-ground for 
extremism, violence and terrorism.14 Libya is a clearing house, not just for human 
trafficking and other criminal activities, but also for the spread of weapons destined for 
extremist groups in countries such as Mali, Niger and Nigeria. According to a UN report, 
14 Jan Rood, Frans-Paul van der Putten, Minke Meijnders, A world order balancing on the brink – Clingendael 
Strategic Monitor 2014, Clingendael Institute, The Hague, June 2014
Negligible
Risk level of terrorism
and political violence: 
Low
Medium
High
Severe
Source: AON, 2015 Terrorism and Political Violence Map (http://www.aon.com/terrorismmap/)
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Libya is the epicentre of the illegal trade in arms – both small arms and shoulder-fired air 
defence missiles – with sales in at least 14 African countries.15
The use of IEDs (improvised explosive devices) has been responsible for no fewer 
than 90% of the victims among the personnel of the UN mission in Mali (MINUSMA), 
according to UN sources.16 African contingents, usually equipped with vehicles offering 
little protection, are especially vulnerable to these.17 The Netherlands has deployed an 
anti-IED team in Mali.18 The threat is also present for the AU mission in Somalia. Boko 
Haram also makes frequent use of IEDs in Cameroon and Nigeria. Suicide attacks 
attributed to Boko Haram are committed frequently by women or children.19 The group 
of UN experts on the DRC also reported in January 2015 on the making of IEDs by the 
Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) operating in the eastern DRC (North Kivu).20 Landmines 
have also been used there recently. African armed forces in countries such as Cameroon 
and Nigeria are making increasing use of drones.
Figures show that 2014 was the year with the highest number of conflict-related 
casualties since 1999.21 The most-affected countries were Nigeria, Sudan, South Sudan, 
Somalia and Libya. Other (post-)conflict areas show a more diffuse picture. For example, 
there have been mounting tensions and the threat of a new war in Burundi over the past 
few months; in the DRC, violence seems to have abated in recent years, but the country 
is on the brink of a highly unstable political situation.
Peacekeeping and intervention
As of late 2015, the United Nations is conducting 16 peacekeeping operations, including 
nine in Africa accounting for almost 85% (or about 90,000) of all peacekeepers deployed 
worldwide. Some 50% of the Blue Helmets in Africa are African troops.22 Nine African 
15 Margriet Drent, Rob Hendriks, Dick Zandee, New Threats, New EU and NATO Responses, Clingendael 
Institute, The Hague, 2015 
16 Josh Butler, Landmine threats down, IED threats rising, Inter Press Service, 2 April 2015
17 Jeremy Binnie, ‘Analysis: UN peacekeepers struggle against IED’s in Africa’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 
6 January 2015
18 Lisa Sharland, Counter-IED technology in UN peacekeeping, International Peace Institute, New York, 2015, 
p. 5 
19 Scott Stewart, An unprecedented use of female suicide bombers, Stratfor, Austin, Texas, 2015
20 Final report of the Group of Experts on the DRC, UN Security Council, New York, January 2015, p. 29.
21 Jakkie Cilliers, ‘Conflict trends in Africa: a turn for the better in 2015’, International Security Studies Today, 
Pretoria, 4 November 2015
22 With some interesting troop contributors. Thus the DRC, where the largest UN mission is deployed, 
provides a battalion of troops to the UN mission in the neighbouring CAR. Ethiopia is currently the largest 
supplier of troops from Africa. All deployed Ethiopian troops operate in Ethiopia’s immediate neighbours.
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states are now among the 15 largest contributors of troops. In addition to the UN 
missions there are also a number of missions under the mandate of the AU, namely the 
extensive AMISOM mission in Somalia23 and a smaller mission against Uganda’s Lord’s 
Resistance Army (LRA).24 At the meeting of the United Nations General Assembly in 
September 2015, many member states pledged more support for strengthening African 
peacekeeping capacities. Along with France, the EU and the US, China is also becoming 
involved increasingly in this field. The joint efforts should lead to the operationalisation 
of the African Standby Force in early 2016, which should have a Rapid Deployment 
Capability.
However, there are a number of problems inherent to the contribution of African troops 
to peacekeeping.25 A first fact is political: troops are usually deployed in neighbouring 
countries; this is the case in Somalia, the DRC, Mali and the CAR. This may have 
advantages, but such a deployment often has additional political and/or economic 
dimensions in support of national interests.26 These factors increase a mission’s 
complexity and undermine its neutrality.27 One example is the innovative special 
intervention brigade consisting of troops from three African countries in the Eastern 
DRC, which was deployed in 2013. Two of the countries contributing troops, South 
Africa and Tanzania, had a strained relationship with Rwanda at the time. In addition 
to their official role (intervention), both contingents therefore also served as a regional 
deterrent.
A second problem stems from the fact that several states on the continent contribute 
troops to risky missions.28 The political credit that such troop deployments generate is 
good for authoritarian states. Ethiopia, Burundi, Rwanda, Chad and Uganda are all major 
contributors. Participation in peacekeeping missions is also financially lucrative and 
offers a way of maintaining excessive military capabilities; in the short term at least, this 
23 The Africa Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) consists of more than 22,000 personnel, including police 
and military components.
24 This mission, deployed mostly in the CAR, is supported by US Special Forces. See: Paul Ronan, The Kony 
Crossroads – President Obama’s Chance to Define His Legacy on the LRA Crisis, The Resolve, Washington, 
2015.
25 Cecilian Hull Wiklund, Gabriella Ingerstad, The Regionalisation of Peace Operations in Africa - Advantages, 
challenges and the way ahead, Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut, Stockholm, 2015, p. 42 
26 Troops from Chad were eventually removed for this reason from MISCA, the AU peacekeeping force in the 
CAR, in 2014. 
27 This is especially true of Somalia. The contingents from Kenya and Ethiopia conduct their own operations 
and are stationed mainly in areas of interest to the two countries.
28 Ty McCormick, ‘Al-Shabab’s Resilient Insurgency’, Foreign Policy, Washington, 24 July 2015
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helps ensure internal stability.29 Demobilisation in Africa often causes problems due to 
the limited absorption capacity of other parts of society.
A third problem concerns the composition and equipment of the contingents. This arises 
particularly when the UN takes over operations, as it has done recently in the CAR and 
Mali. With a few exceptions, African missions are largely dependent on external funding 
and equipment.30
Over the past decade, it has also become increasingly obvious that the existing 
intervention model has reached its limits. In the DRC, South Sudan, the CAR and Mali, 
UN missions are under permanent pressure due to their lack of capacity to offer the 
civilian population effective protection. These tensions are exacerbated by regular 
allegations of misconduct among peacekeepers,31 and are exploited eagerly by political 
actors – from armed groups to governments – that are able to limit the missions’ political 
role in this way. This last point is true of the UN mission in the DRC, for example.32 
Long-term peace missions appear to have a tendency to perpetuate situations in which 
nobody ultimately dares assume any responsibility, and a status quo that suits the parties 
to the conflict can be maintained.
In addition to this participation in international or regional missions, there is a growing 
twilight zone in which a number of African states deploy troops. Such deployment is 
also characterised by increasing complexity, including the use of air power.33 The use 
of African troops on both sides during the Second Congo War of 1998 to 2003 remains 
the largest of its kind to date, and interference by neighbouring countries in the 
DRC continues. More recently, the involvement of Ugandan troops on the side of the 
government forces in the South Sudanese civil war can be cited. Another example is 
29 Charles Ndayiziga, Enjeux autour de l’intervention du Burundi en Somalie, Egmont Institute, Bruxelles, 2013. 
The direct benefits paid to contingents (per diem financial allowances) are often sizeable, and make even 
dangerous missions such as AMISOM popular – as is the case for Burundi. However, hazardous situations 
can arise – as during a previous coup in Ivory Coast (1999) or more recent protests in Cameroon – if 
promised rewards are paid late or not at all.
30 The EU makes a significant financial contribution here with the African Peace Facility (APF); see Chapter 3.
31 Recently mainly in the CAR, where the French contingent (Operation Sangaris) has also come under 
fire, with serious political implications for the credibility of the international presence. The allegations 
ultimately led to the resignation of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the UN. See: Nick 
Cumming-Bruce, ‘UN official says French learned early of abuse’, International New York Times, New York, 
15 October 2015
32 Congo: ending the Status Quo, International Crisis Group, Brussels, December 2014
33 More and more countries are developing a fairly sophisticated capacity. The Ugandan intervention in South 
Sudan included air support from SU-30 aircraft and Mi-24 helicopters. In the Sahel region, the preference 
seems to be for aircraft such as the Embraer Tucano, which has both a reconnaissance and a ground attack 
capability. Air resources are also used in many ways in the fight against Boko Haram.
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the deployment of the regional Multi-National Joint Task Force in the Lake Chad basin 
(Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger), in which troops mostly from Chad are being 
deployed actively in the countries concerned.34
End of a decade of growth?
The stagnation of the global economy and particularly the slowdown in China, have 
led to the revision of economic growth figures in Africa.35 Apart from a few exceptions 
such as Ethiopia, the continent remains primarily an exporter of raw materials with 
limited processing. Falling prices and output are leading to increasing social tensions. 
Thousands of job losses, shrinking government budgets (in the DRC by more than 10%), 
continued population growth, inefficient agriculture, an increased debt burden and a 
lack of economic diversification are a potentially dangerous mix. States such as Nigeria, 
Algeria and Angola – all of which have an important regional role but are also suffering 
34 African-led counter-terrorism measures against Boko Haram, European Parliament Research Service, 
Brussels, March 2015. This last case, like the deployment of troops from neighbouring countries in Somalia, 
is unusual because of the external interest in counter-terrorism. Thus France, the UK and the US are 
providing assistance with intelligence, the use of special forces and unmanned platforms. Helene Cooper, 
‘To Aid Boko Haram Fight, Obama Orders 300 Troops to Cameroon’, International New York Times, New 
York, 14 October 2015.
35 François Soudan, ’L’Afrique frissonne’, Jeune Afrique No. 2857, Paris, 17 Octobre 2015; Sub-Saharan Africa – 
World Economic Prospects, World Bank, Washington, June 2015
Policeagents from the African Union mission AMISOM. Photo: AMISOM Public Information.
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from considerable internal instability – are almost entirely dependent on the export of 
crude oil. South Africa, the driving force in Southern Africa, has already contended for 
years with stagnating growth and a profound social crisis. This social crisis has helped 
generate the recent wave of xenophobic violence, which has also put the country’s 
wider political role under pressure.36 The influx of migrants to South Africa, like that 
to Europe, is itself partly attributable to the continuing lack of economic prospects for 
entire generations. The deteriorating economic situation in South Africa has obviously 
not changed this.
The rhetoric of growth has also exacerbated a situation where little attention has 
been paid to the continent’s structural economic problems. Opportunities to attend 
school are generally still extremely limited (even in countries such as Kenya), energy 
production and infrastructure remain inadequate and the transport sector is lagging 
behind, while industrial and agricultural production are characterised by inefficiency and 
insufficient output. The investment climate and fiscal and other legislation are in need of 
a thorough overhaul. Part of the solution to these problems could lie in growing regional 
integration, but this generally remains a highly theoretical process, and although there 
is the intention to address these issues within the African Union, the organisation lacks 
legitimacy, drive and resources.
Demography, development and conflict
The African continent has the world’s fastest demographic growth. More than half of the 
increase in the world’s population to 2050 will occur on this continent. The total African 
population will grow from 1.2 billion in 2015 to 1.7 billion in 2030 and 2.5 billion in 2050.37 
Some 42% of the population is under the age of 15.38 The average birth rate per woman 
in sub-Saharan Africa is 5.5.39 The countries in the Sahel region are outliers, with, for 
example, seven births per woman in Niger. Southern Africa and North Africa have a 
lower rate of population growth.40
36 In 2008 and in the spring of 2015, South Africa experienced a significant explosion of xenophobic violence 
against migrants, mainly from other countries in Southern Africa. T. Hamdziripi, ‘Xenophobia in South 
Africa: dispelling the myths, explaining the reality’, ISS Today, 12 February 2015
37 World Population Prospects – The 2015 Revision. Key findings and advance tables, United Nations, New York, 
2015, p. 1
38 Lilli Sippel, et al., Africa’s Demographic Challenges- How a young population can make development possible, 
Berlin Institut für Bevölkerung und Entwicklung, 2011
39 Serge Michailof, Africanistan, Fayard, Paris, 2015, p. 28
40 Jakkie Cilliers, Julia Schüneman, The future of intrastate conflict in Africa – More violence or greater peace?, 
Institute of Security Studies, Pretoria, 2013
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High birth rates and young populations are putting enormous pressure on the social 
infrastructure (education and healthcare), and are offsetting the often-high economic 
growth rates. Sub-Saharan Africa (excluding South Africa) represents 80% of Africa’s 
population and 45% of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP).41 One consequence of the 
high population growth is high levels of unemployment and a lack of prospects for many 
young Africans, regardless of their educational background.42 The experience of the 
Arab Spring in North Africa points to the rapid political mobilisation of a young, highly 
educated population.
Electoral and political tensions
Electoral processes continue to be a conspicuous source of instability and political 
violence on the African continent. The stakes are high: the winning camp gains control 
of the state and the economy, while the loser is left empty-handed. This ‘winner takes all’ 
model also points to the limitations of the institutional reforms of recent years, mostly in 
so-called ‘post-conflict’ countries. Although constitutional constraints (in terms of the 
duration and number of terms of office) have been introduced, political power has been 
decentralised and directly-elected parliaments have been set up, often with extensive 
powers, in most cases the executive remains clearly in control.43 The presidential model, 
with a high degree of concentration of political power, is still dominant. In addition, 
research has shown that in those cases where there has been a genuine transfer of 
political power – such as in Ghana, Zambia and recently Nigeria – effective service 
delivery remains poor. Support programmes and years of investment in governance 
reform, such as security sector reform (SSR), have only had a limited impact.44 
Corruption is an important factor, because it undermines the effectiveness of national 
institutions and social norms, and entrenches political grievances.45
The electoral problem is a particularly current issue in Central Africa.46 A decade ago, 
tortuous peace processes in the DRC and Burundi were rounded-off with elections. 
41 Serge Michailof, op. cit.
42 Jakkie Cilliers, Julia Schüneman, op. cit. 
43 Nic Cheeseman, Democracy in Africa, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2015
44 Thierry Vircoulon, Insights from the Burundian Crisis (I): An Army divided and losing its Way, International 
Crisis Group, Brussels, 2 October 2015 
45 World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development, World Bank, Washington, 2011
46 The list of long-serving heads of state in the region is impressive: Sassou Nguesso (Republic of Congo) 
since 1997 (and previously between 1979 and 1992); Obiang Nguema (Equatorial Guinea) since 1979; Paul 
Biya (Cameroon) since 1982; Idriss Deby (Chad) since 1990; Paul Kagame (Rwanda) since 2000; Joseph 
Kabila (DRC) since 2001. In Gabon, the regime is a dynastic continuation of the Bongo regime by Bongo’s 
son.
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However, reforms were only implemented to a limited degree, and in both countries 
the ruling powers and their associates were not prepared to accept any alternative to 
political power. The same applies to neighbouring countries such as Rwanda, Angola, 
Uganda and the Republic of Congo, and leads to all manner of attempts to eliminate 
existing constitutional constraints. In Burundi, the entire acquis of the Arusha process 
is in danger of being lost. The country has been on the brink of the abyss again for the 
past few several months, and ethnically-motivated violence is on the rise; the latter is 
particularly alarming. The DRC has also been in a phase of growing political tension for 
more than a year now, and the government’s relations with the international community 
are fraught with tension.
A number of states, including Chad, Cameroon, Angola, Zimbabwe, Uganda and Algeria, 
face similar structural problems hindering effective political transition. The example of 
Burkina Faso shows that even where attempts to hold onto power fail due to a strong 
mobilisation of opposition and civil society, transitions are still extremely fragile. The 
political situation in the countries concerned is and remains highly vulnerable. The 
interests of the various parties are so fundamental that the search for a new stability 
will be a long one. The resilience of political systems built on nepotism and patrimonial 
networks is hard to estimate. In those cases where an eventual confrontation is avoided 
– such as in Senegal with the departure of President Wade, and perhaps also in Benin 
in the near future – power can change hands effectively. Adapting governance and 
carrying out effective reforms proves far harder, however.
For external actors such as the US and the EU, it is increasingly difficult to take 
action in these complex political situations. Regional organisations are often turned 
to for assistance – with varying success. The organisations and the African countries 
involved in their activities are often divided or have differing plans. Sovereignty and 
non-interference remain guiding principles. One important exception is the fairly 
straightforward approach to coups taken by the AU.
Regional analysis
North Africa still contends with a high level of political and social instability.47 Egypt and 
Tunisia face organised centres of armed resistance, which have a major impact on a 
key economic driver, tourism. Since the ousting of Gaddafi, Libya remains a completely 
imploded state posing an ongoing threat to regional security. Morocco is still relatively 
stable, as for the time being is its great rival Algeria, where there is growing uncertainty 
about the necessary political transition and generational change. The continuing 
47 Daveed Gartenstein-Ross et al., The Crisis in North Africa, Implications for Europe and Options for EU 
Policymakers, Clingendael Institute, The Hague, 2015
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tensions between Morocco and Algeria have been felt far into the south, and have a 
negative impact on political processes in the Sahel region.
In West Africa, the elections in Nigeria have not led to the feared implosion of the 
country, which is afflicted by Boko Haram and persistent problems in the Niger Delta. 
The new government must tackle both crises urgently, and this is also necessary 
for Nigeria to assume a regional leadership role. The Sahel can be characterised as 
an extremely unstable zone which, due in part to the Sahel states’ lack of capacity 
and political legitimacy, remains a haven for a wide range of criminal and terrorist 
organisations – including from Libya. Outside the Sahel too, there is a group of mostly 
weak states. Countries such as Guinea-Bissau are very attractive to international 
criminal networks.48 In the Lake Chad basin, Cameroon, Chad and Niger are plagued by 
the presence of Boko Haram. The radical movement has ensured that the conflict has 
developed into a profound regional crisis over the past year.
Both the powerhouses of Southern Africa (South Africa and Angola) are struggling with 
a severe socio-economic crisis, and with increasing political tensions as well, although 
in fundamentally different ways. In addition, there are ongoing political crises in Lesotho, 
Madagascar and Zimbabwe, and rising tensions in Mozambique. Zambia too faces a 
serious economic crisis. South Africa has also been harmed by the xenophobic violence 
that finds its breeding-ground in the social crisis and the attraction that the country 
nevertheless continues to exert on people from neighbouring countries. The region is 
far from immune to severe tensions, and regional organisations, in particular the SADC, 
have been weakened by member states’ internal problems. This will also have an impact 
on neighbouring regions; the DRC is a member of SADC, and it remains to be seen 
whether the organisation will continue to exercise the leadership role it previously held.
In East Africa and the Horn, instability is still centred primarily around Somalia and the 
intertwined conflicts in the two Sudans. Regional leadership is shared by an increasingly 
active Ethiopia and Kenya. Ethiopia is undergoing a major economic transformation and 
is emerging as the region’s key player. In economic terms, Kenya is still the gateway to 
East and part of Central Africa, but internally it is weighed down by powerful tensions, 
both politically and socially. The country also lives with a permanent terrorist threat. 
Uganda plays an important role in South Sudan and as a troop contributor, but is also 
gearing up for elections again, in which President Museveni – in power since 1996 – will 
succeed himself once more. A development that could have important implications for 
the conflicts in the Sudans is the recent rapprochement between Sudan and Uganda.49 
At sub-regional level, the region has proved unable to come up with an adequate 
48 Not just in transit – Drugs, the State and Society in West Africa, West Africa Commission on Drugs, Geneva, 
June 2014
49 Sudan, Uganda: The End of a Rivalry, Stratfor, Austin, Texas, September 2015
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response to the electoral crisis in Burundi, a member of the East Africa Community 
(EAC). Further regional integration has also been thwarted by serious internal divisions. 
East African states are becoming more frequently involved in partnerships with the Gulf 
States. Troops from Sudan and probably also Eritrea are taking part in the conflict in 
Yemen.50
The political and security situation in Central Africa is dominated by the efforts 
of incumbent regimes to stay in power. In part, this is an indication of the lack of 
consolidation of the state, and the only partial consolidation of the peace processes 
forming the basis of the present political constellation. In Burundi, a return to ethnically-
motivated violence seems imminent, possibly resulting in a new civil war, and in the 
DRC too, tensions are running high and there is the potential for wider conflict that 
threatens to destroy the achievements of the past decade. In the CAR, the international 
community, in pushing for elections, seems to be ignoring the need to address the 
underlying causes of conflict; the country therefore remains on the brink of a further 
implosion. Cameroon and Congo-Brazzaville are run by geriatric regimes which stay 
in the saddle through a combination of repression and buying out an opportunistic 
opposition. A difficult transition can be expected there when these regimes eventually 
disappear.
The consequences for the EU
Relations between the EU and Africa have always been complex, and given the 
developments on the continent and worldwide, this complexity will only increase. This 
requires an approach from the EU and its member states – a number of which maintain 
an extensive and complex relationship with the continent – going beyond simple 
rhetoric. At the strategic level, Europe’s influence in Africa will tend to decrease due 
to the growing role of other international actors, especially China, but also India, Brazil 
and the US. For Europe, this implies a process of adaptation that will not run equally 
smoothly everywhere – in France, for example. External actors’ interests coincide in 
part, but in economic terms they are often competitors. Even more than is the case 
today, African states and regimes will start to position themselves actively in this field. 
An additional factor is that political and economic developments on the continent are 
growing more complex. Again, this requires a reinforcement of Europe’s capacity to 
appraise these tendencies accurately. There is a need for more dialogue, and above all 
more profound dialogue, with the various powers across the continent.
In addition to this gradually waning influence in Africa, exacerbated partly by the 
internal weakness of the EU, the impact on Europe of developments in Africa will 
50 The Emirati Navy Arrives in Eritrea, Stratfor, Austin, Texas, October 2015
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continue to increase. Together with African actors, there is a need to work on controlling 
demographic growth – which is exceeding the capacity of entire regions. Investment 
must also be made in economic growth centres. Migration can benefit Africa and 
Europe, but there is currently very limited support for it. Moreover, it has security 
consequences when it leads to a lack of integration and entire groups are marginalised. 
However, managing migration and terrorism will not lead to a lasting relationship if the 
main focus is on a policing and military approach – as is also evident in other regions. 
The approach will need to be broader, but should be based at all levels on a thorough 
understanding of political and social developments, and on dialogue.
21
3  The EU’s comprehensive 
approach
 Hans Merket
The great range of instruments and areas of action covered by the European Union’s 
foreign policy is both its source of power and its Achilles’ heel. In security policy terms, 
the EU plays a role throughout the conflict cycle, from conflict prevention, peace-making 
and peacekeeping through to reconstruction. This important comparative advantage 
enables it to deal with complex problems, but it also makes policy coherence hard to 
achieve. Ensuring consistency between powers, EU institutions and member states is 
an old problem, not least with regard to the often compartmentalised and extremely 
sovereignty-sensitive Common Security and Defence Policy.
The comprehensive approach: about words…
The ‘broad’, ‘integrated’ or ‘comprehensive’ approach has therefore loomed for a long 
time over the EU policy debate as an ideal image of the harmonisation of all external 
actions. This desire for greater cohesion was made central to the constitutional reforms 
of the Lisbon Treaty, which also gave it a better institutional underpinning. This is 
reflected in the ‘two hats’ of the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy, who is also Vice-President of the European Commission (a role currently fulfilled 
by the Italian Federica Mogherini), and the European External Action Service (EEAS) 
which also includes the EU Delegations.
In the course of 2012, when the dust from these often hard-fought changes was 
beginning to settle, an inter-institutional working group was set up to make the 
EU’s comprehensive approach a reality. The then High Representative, Catherine 
Ashton, raised the bar and stated resolutely that “[W]e cannot succeed without this 
comprehensive approach – it is simply not enough to chase and deter pirates, not 
enough to try and do development when there is no security, not enough to try and 
provide economic support without a stable government”.51 Although the abstract 
terminology of the comprehensive approach in European policy rhetoric already 
represented a response to the most complex challenges, it was not until December 2013 
that a first attempt was made to put this into practice, with the joint Communication of 
the High Representative and the Commission on ‘The EU’s comprehensive approach to 
51 Catherine Ashton, Statement on EEAS Review, Strasbourg, 2013
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external conflicts and crises’.52 This was then ‘welcomed’ in May 2014 – not confirmed 
– in the Conclusions of the Foreign Affairs Council on ‘The EU’s comprehensive 
approach’.53 The ideas set out here are not in themselves new. According to the High 
Representative and the Commission, they have been “applied successfully as the 
organising principle for EU action in many cases in recent years, for example, in the Horn 
of Africa, the Sahel and the Great Lakes”.54 With the comprehensive approach, however, 
the EU wishes to apply the concept more systematically in its external action. To this 
end, a methodology is being defined that attempts to combine the wide array of both 
external instruments (diplomacy, trade, development cooperation, humanitarian aid) and 
internal instruments (fisheries policy, energy, justice) in a more coherent and efficient 
approach that maximises synergies and avoids obstruction.
This methodology starts with an inter-institutional and inter-departmental analysis 
of the root causes of potential conflict, the main actors, the trends, and the risks of 
action or inaction on the part of the EU. On this basis, a common strategic vision is 
being developed as the foundation for comprehensive EU action. Two points are central 
here. Firstly, the comprehensive approach systematises processes and mechanisms 
promoting continuous interaction and exchange between often segregated policy 
communities. This is essential, because it is often hard for the relevant expertise and 
intelligence to surmount the departmental walls within and between EU institutions. The 
model example of this is the Crisis Platform, which has been set up within the EEAS. 
In response to specific needs and crises, all relevant EU actors come together on this 
platform, i.e. crisis management institutions such as the EU Military Staff (EUMS), the 
Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD) and the Civilian Planning and 
Conduct Capability (CPCC), as well as representatives of Commission departments such 
as ECHO, DG DEVCO55 and the Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI). Together, 
they then reach a common understanding of the problem and a definition of a collective 
approach. Secondly, the comprehensive approach emphasises that no blueprints or 
standard solutions exist. It therefore takes concrete situations as its starting point, 
meaning that better use also needs to be made of the EU Delegations.
Instead of a visionary strategy that imposes a predefined plan rigidly, this focus on 
policy processes and contextual factors proposes a systematic approach that assesses 
results and impacts continuously and monitors progress. Such an approach is important 
52 High Representative and European Commission, Joint communication to the European Parliament and the 
Council: The EU’s comprehensive approach to external conflicts and crises, Brussels, 2013
53 Council conclusions on the EU’s comprehensive approach, Foreign Affairs Council, 3312th meeting, 
Brussels, 2014
54 High Representative and European Commission, op. cit.
55 ECHO: EU Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection department; DG DEVCO: Directorate-General for 
International Cooperation and Development
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because, in the words of the Commission, “[T]here is rarely enough information to make 
decisions and choices with full confidence. It is often necessary to engage in a more 
complex process whereby analysis and assessment is continuous to allow adjustment 
when circumstances change and/or new information and insight comes to light.”56 The 
comprehensive approach is designed to combine the strengths and capabilities of the 
EU optimally, adapted to the specific needs of the given situation. Moreover, through a 
long-term commitment, the EU wants to shift the focus to the prevention of conflict.
After many frantic efforts to grasp the complex connections between challenges and 
areas of action in a wide range of concepts such as ‘fragility’, the ‘security-development 
nexus’, ‘policy coherence for development’ and so on,57 this more pragmatic approach is 
promising. The influence of foreign policy is indirect, multidimensional and contextual. It 
follows that consistency cannot be enforced from above by politically-correct – but often 
meaningless – calls for improved cooperation. Coherence must be achieved in practice 
by bringing policymakers in contact with each other, generating mutual understanding 
56 Operating in Situations of Conflict and Fragility: An EU Staff Handbook, European Commission, Brussels, 2014
57 See for example: Council Conclusions on the EU Response to Situations of Fragility, General Affairs 
and External Relations Council, 2831st meeting, Brussels, 2007; Council conclusions on Security and 
Development, General Affairs and External Relations Council, 2831st meeting, Brussels, 2007; Policy 
Coherence for Development: Accelerating progress towards attaining the Millennium Development Goals, 
European Commission, Brussels, 2005
Humanitarian aid from ECHO. Photo: European Commission DG ECHO.
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and ensuring continuous feedback between policy formulation and implementation. This 
in essence is what the EU’s comprehensive approach will do. In their brevity, however, 
both the joint Communication and the Council Conclusions remain somewhat non-
committal.
… and deeds
The foundations of an innovative approach have been laid, but thorough efforts will be 
needed to translate this into operational and procedural terms at all levels of intra- and 
inter-institutional cooperation. Three difficulties illustrate this in concrete terms.
In the first place, it is not entirely clear what purpose the comprehensive approach 
ultimately serves. The title of the Communication suggests that the emphasis is 
on external conflicts and crises, whereas the Council Conclusions state that the 
principles apply to “the broad spectrum of EU external action”.58 This lack of clarity 
raises questions, in particular about the objective of improved conflict prevention. The 
EU has established an extensive system of conflict analysis (with a conflict-sensitive 
‘political economy analysis’ developed by DG DEVCO and a light-touch ‘conflict analysis 
tool’ launched by the EEAS)59; moreover, the EU has activated a six-monthly ‘early 
warning system’. It is not clear how these systems affect policymaking in the relevant 
departments, workgroups and decision-making centres of the Commission, the Council 
and the EEAS; yet clear reporting lines and communication channels are essential if the 
intended focus on prevention is to be achieved.
This problem is expressed clearly in the implementation of the regional integrated 
strategies adopted mainly at the instigation of the EEAS, such as the Strategy for 
Security and Development in the Sahel, the Strategic Framework for the Horn of 
Africa, the Strategic Framework for the Great Lakes Region, and the Strategy on the 
Gulf of Guinea.60 Rather than being far-sighted policy frameworks designed to prevent 
conflict, these documents attempt to create ex post consistency between existing, often 
isolated initiatives. Thus, despite the adoption of a Strategic Framework for the Horn 
of Africa, the EU proved to be unprepared for the independence of South Sudan and 
its subsequent government collapse. Again, the Sahel Strategy was no guarantee of a 
58 Foreign Affairs Council, 2014, op. cit. 
59 See also: Guidance Note on the Use of Conflict Analysis in Support of EU External Action, EEAS and 
European Commission, Brussels, 2013
60 Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel, EEAS, Brussels, 2011; Strategic Framework for the 
Horn of Africa, Foreign Affairs Council, 3124th meeting, Brussels, 2011; High Representative and European 
Commission, Joint Communication on a Strategic Framework for the Great Lakes Region, Brussels, 2013; EU 
Strategy on the Gulf of Guinea, Foreign Affairs Council, 3324th meeting, Brussels, 2014
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common approach to the crisis in Libya, with the failure of the EUFOR Libya military-
humanitarian operation in 2011 as a notorious low point.61
Secondly, the contextual approach relies to a large extent on the ability of both EU 
Delegations and the Special Representatives (EUSRs) (who are barely mentioned in the 
Communication and not at all in the Council Conclusions) to provide input for policy 
development and steer its implementation. Both suffer from shortcomings that seriously 
restrict their reach within the spectrum of EU foreign policy. The former Commission 
Delegations were transformed into fully-fledged EU Delegations by the Lisbon Treaty. 
For the first time in the history of European integration, the EU thus has a single point 
of contact in non-EU countries and for relations with international organisations, for the 
EU’s full range of powers. As what might be thought of as EU ‘antennae’ and ‘feelers’, 
these Delegations are ideally positioned to translate the comprehensive approach into 
practice. This potential is only exploited to a limited extent however. The significant 
expansion of their powers took place without any significant contribution of additional 
resources, resulting in a significant lack of capacity, and understaffing. This is especially 
problematic in the areas of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the 
CSDP which are relatively new for these Delegations. In Africa, they have a long history 
of implementing large-scale development programmes. Although today they essentially 
play a political role and are increasingly seen as EU embassies, their organisational style 
therefore continues to be characterised more by project management than by diplomacy. 
Moreover, these Delegations have very little opportunity to define their own emphases, 
and complain that their input and advice is not taken into proper consideration by the 
institutions in Brussels.62
In addition, the European Union can appoint Special Representatives who hold a 
geographical or thematic mandate under the authority of the High Representative. In the 
words of former High Representative Solana, the list of Special Representatives is “in 
part, also a list of where our foreign and security policy priorities lie”.63 By this reasoning, 
the priorities for African security lie in the Sahel (Michel Dominique Reveyrand-de 
Menthon), the Horn of Africa (Alexander Rondos) and the Middle East peace process 
(Fernando Gentilini). In the context of the increasing tendency to establish integrated 
regional strategies, these Special Representatives offer important added value. They can 
61 The military operation, which aimed to support humanitarian assistance in the country, was outlined in a 
Council Decision of 1 April 2011. See: Council decision on a European Union military operation in support of 
humanitarian assistance operations in response to the crisis situation in Libya (EUFOR Libya), Council of the 
European Union, Brussels, 2011. The operation was never launched. 
62 J. Wouters et al., The Organisation and Functioning of the European External Action Service: Achievements, 
Challenges and Opportunities, Directorate-General for External Policies of the European Parliament, 
Brussels, 2013
63 Javier Solana, ‘Opening remarks’ at seminar with EU Special Representatives, Brussels, 29 June 2005
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raise the national coordination by EU Delegations up to, and link it with, the regional 
level. However, these EUSRs are traditionally CFSP actors and are hence less familiar 
with fields such as development cooperation, humanitarian aid or trade. Moreover, the 
division of tasks between the Special Representatives and the EU Delegations is often 
unclear, and cooperation is limited.64 Despite the existence of integrated strategies for 
the Sahel, the Horn of Africa, the Great Lakes and the Gulf of Guinea there is, in other 
words, no single EU actor on the spot with a comprehensive knowledge of, and focus on, 
the conditions and implications of EU policy. As a result, the comprehensive approach 
is left without comprehensive leadership in its vital translation to the context to which it 
relates.
A third difficulty concerns the CSDP’s limited integration in the EU’s comprehensive 
approach. Under pressure from member states that feared losing control over the CSDP 
to the comprehensive approach, this competence is only mentioned in passing in the 
two basic documents. Nevertheless, the need to align the CSDP with other policy areas 
constitutes one of the biggest obstacles to the success of the comprehensive approach. 
With compartmentalised and often introverted institutions and procedures, the CSDP is 
developing as a ‘moving target’ in response to the challenges it addresses.65 This makes 
it particularly difficult to pin down for coordination efforts. With the developing ‘civilising’ 
mission of the CSDP – increasingly long-term engagement and growing specialisation 
in the reform of the security sector and capacity-building – the interfaces with EU 
development cooperation in particular will inevitably increase. Civilian missions such as 
EUCAP Nestor, EUCAP Sahel Niger, EUBAM Libya and EUCAP Sahel Mali are entering 
territory that is already occupied actively by Commission-supported development 
projects, with obvious risks of fragmentation, duplication and inter-institutional tensions.
The way forward
In light of these difficulties, it is encouraging that the EU’s comprehensive approach 
does not present itself as a dogma carved in stone. “[T]he work is not over.”66 The 
methodology must evolve further and offer a response to changing priorities and 
needs. Central to this is an annual action plan in which the High Representative and 
the Commission outline how “key actions set out in the Joint Communication and 
64 A report by the European Court of Auditors states that only half of the surveyed EU Heads of Delegation 
believe they are properly informed about the activities of the Special Representatives in their region. 
See: The Establishment of the European External Action Service – Special Report No.11, European Court of 
Auditors, Brussels, 2014.
65 Simon Stroß, One Goal, Many Paths: The Promotion of Policy Coherence for Development in EU Policy 
Formulation, Druck und Verlag: epubli GmbH Berlin, 2014
66 High Representative and European Commission, 2013, op. cit.
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these Council Conclusions, in close cooperation with EU Member States, and based on 
concrete country and regional cases, will be taken forward, implemented and reported, 
with identified lead structures”.67 The first such action plan was published in May 2015.68 
Although rather meagre in terms of concrete measures or commitments, it is important 
because it streamlines efforts relating to a number of thematic and geographical 
priorities. Four key actions were put forward for 2015. The involvement of the CSDP in 
the comprehensive approach is a particularly striking element here.
Firstly, work has been done on the guidelines covering the Joint Framework Documents 
(JFDs). According to the methodology of the comprehensive approach, these set out a 
shared strategic vision for all actions (including the CSDP) of the EU and its member 
states in a given country, based on a common contextual analysis in which the EU 
Delegations and member state embassies play a central role.
A second priority is capacity-building for security and development. This is an extension 
of the so-called ‘Train and Equip’ concept69 and aims, by means of concerted CSDP and 
development initiatives, to put partner countries and regional organisations in a better 
position to prevent and manage crises themselves. Recent experiences with CSDP 
training missions in Mali and Somalia and the work on the African Peace and Security 
Architecture (APSA) have shown that in many cases, lasting and effective results are 
not achieved due to a lack of basic equipment in the partner country. These shortages 
range from footwear and uniforms to vehicles (in principle the EU does not supply lethal 
equipment). Given the considerable pressure on the limited budget for civilian CSDP 
missions, other external financing instruments (such as the Financial Instrument for 
Development Cooperation, the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace and the 
European Development Fund) may offer some relief here.
However, these tools are inadequate for this kind of support for the CSDP. In the EU 
multiannual financial framework for 2014-2020, at least 90% of expenditure must fall 
within the OECD criteria for Official Development Assistance. Capacity-building in the 
security sector is not automatically ruled out by this criterion, but requires a specific 
exemption in each case.70 In this connection, the African Peace Facility is more flexible, 
because as part of the European Development Fund it does not fall within the general EU 
budget. It thus plays an important role in APSA capacity-building, but most of its funding 
67 EU Strategy on the Gulf of Guinea, Foreign Affairs Council, 3324th Council Meeting, Brussels, 2014
68 High Representative and European Commission, Taking forward the EU’s Comprehensive Approach to 
external conflict and crises Action Plan, Brussels, 2015
69 Thierry Tardy, Enabling partners to manage crises. From ‘train and equip’ to capacity-building, European 
Union Institute for Security Studies, Paris, 18 June 2015, p. 18
70 Thus the Instrument contributing to Safety and Peace, for example, has been used for material support for 
the civil security services in Niger and Mali. 
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for 2014-2016 has already been swallowed up by financial support for the expensive 
African Union operations MISCA (Central African Republic) and AMISOM (Somalia). 
Moreover, this regional facility may not be used for spending at a national level. So in 
order to circumvent this limitation, the training centre of EUTM Somalia was presented 
as an AMISOM facility in the programming of the African Peace Facility. In April 2015, 
the Commission and the High Representative made a number of concrete suggestions 
to modify or extend the existing set of instruments and improve interaction with CSDP 
missions and operations.71 For instance, work is currently being done on proposals for a 
new dedicated instrument – or a modification of the existing instruments – for capacity-
building in the security sector, as well as on a comprehensive EU strategic framework for 
the reform of the security sector.
The third priority area also focuses on improved coordination between CSDP missions 
and operations and EU initiatives as a whole. Under the heading ‘transitions’, the EU 
wants to ensure that planning is coordinated between the EEAS, the Commission and 
member states at an earlier stage and more effectively, in order to smooth the transition 
between the different forms of EU involvement. The idea is that such transition strategies 
will be completely integrated into the planning of new and revised CSDP missions. This 
is vital, because results are often thrown away due to a lack of long-term vision and 
follow-up activities after CSDP interventions have come to an end. Thus, the EUNAVFOR 
Atalanta operation has already achieved impressive results in combating piracy in the 
Indian Ocean, but there is a very real danger that this phenomenon will reappear once 
the operation has been terminated. Firstly, the root causes of this problem on land are 
not being adequately addressed, i.e. the precarious state and security structure and 
lack of legitimate economic opportunities for Somalis. Secondly, countries in the region 
have not yet built up sufficient maritime and other capacity to take over the tasks of 
this operation – despite the EU’s training efforts through the EUCAP Nestor mission. 
Exit strategies are also lacking for rapid development interventions. The Instrument 
contributing to Stability and Peace, for example, is essential for restoring the necessary 
conditions for development cooperation, but follow-up is often flawed or even non-
existent. For instance, an independent 2011 evaluation of the support given by the 
European Commission to conflict prevention and peace-building, revealed that only 
seven of the 36 country and regional strategy papers (Country Strategy Papers and 
Regional Strategy Papers) studied included an exit strategy to ensure the transition to 
long-term instruments.72
71 Capacity building in support of security and development – Enabling partners to prevent and manage crises, 
High Representative and European Commission, Brussels, 2015
72 Thematic Evaluation of European Commission Support to Conflict Prevention and Peace-Building, Aide à la 
Décision Economique, Louvain-le-Neuve, Octobre 2011
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Fourthly, new methods are being developed for the rapid deployment of joint (EEAS, 
Commission, member states’) field missions. Such missions have been sent out 
previously for fact-finding and technical assessment to Mali, Mauritania, Niger, 
Algeria and Libya. The intention now is to systematise and institutionalise this ad 
hoc practice. This is necessary in order to utilise the Union’s different strengths and 
capacities effectively and proactively. Better coordination will also help in reducing 
the “unacceptable strain on the receiving host nation, causing confusion and some 
ambiguity of intent. [It] would show the EU in a better light, save money and favour more 
comprehensive planning.”73
The best way to test the EU’s comprehensive approach is in practice, and the action plan 
therefore sets four geographical priorities for 2015. These are the Sahel and Somalia 
along with Central America and Afghanistan. In line with the Regional Action Plan for 
the Sahel adopted in April 2015, the emphasis here is on preventing and countering 
radicalisation, creating opportunities for youth, migration and mobility, and border 
management and combating trafficking and transnational organised crime. Building 
on the Somali Compact (2013) and the EU Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa 
(2011), the comprehensive approach focuses in this country on developing shared 
(conflict) analysis and improved knowledge of the situation on the ground, more 
effective harmonisation of the different strengths and capacities of the EU (including 
capacity-building for peace and development), and a continued partnership with the 
African Union.
Finally, whereas Ashton proclaimed that “[W]e don’t need a new European security 
strategy: we have the comprehensive approach”,74 her successor Mogherini has argued 
in forthright terms for a new strategy: “Vertical and horizontal silos hamper the EU’s 
potential global role. And in a world of mounting challenges and opportunities this is a 
luxury we cannot afford. In a more connected, contested and complex world, we need 
a clear sense of direction. We need to agree on our priorities, our goals and the means 
required to achieve them. We need a common, comprehensive and consistent EU global 
strategy”.75
At the European Council meeting of June 2015, Mogherini received a formal mandate 
to pursue this process of strategic reflection “with a view to preparing an EU global 
strategy on foreign and security policy to be submitted to the European Council by June 
2016”.76 It is therefore important to ask how this reflection and the eventual strategy 
73 Annual 2013 CSDP Lessons Report, EEAS, Brussels, March 2014
74 Quoted in: Damien Helly, Greta Galeazzi, Avant la lettre? The EU’s comprehensive approach (to crises) in the 
Sahel, European Centre for Development Policy Management, Maastricht, February 2015, p. 75
75 EEAS, 2015, op. cit.
76 Conclusions of the European Council, European Council, June 2015
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relate to the EU’s comprehensive approach. That approach is first and foremost a way 
of collaborating across the boundaries of institutions, departments and policy areas. As 
Mogherini puts it above, the essence of a strategy lies in formulating and arriving at a 
consensus on the general priorities, goals and means required to achieve them. In this 
way, the two can form a complementary whole, with a security strategy that sets the 
overall direction and is implemented using the methods and policy processes of the EU’s 
comprehensive approach.
The EU’s comprehensive approach is still at an early and experimental stage. What 
is innovative about it is the transition from conceptualising to operationalising policy 
coherence. This has considerable potential, but continued efforts are needed to 
translate the proposed focus on integrated policy processes and contextual factors to 
all levels of the EU’s institutional framework – particularly in relation to the CSDP – and 
collaboration with the member states. These elements must prevent the comprehensive 
approach from becoming an empty political slogan, given that it is supposed to provide 
answers to highly diverse and complex challenges. The ultimate goal of these additional 
efforts should be to maximise interaction between departments, institutions and 
member states, to facilitate the exchange of insight, expertise and intelligence. This will 
then result in a better mix of the array of instruments available to the EU and its member 
states, tailored to the needs and requirements of each specific situation.
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4 The CSDP in Africa
 Minke Meijnders & Dick Zandee
CSDP operations and missions in Africa
Since the first military operations and civilian missions were launched under the 
European Security and Defence Policy (the predecessor of the CSDP), the EU has been 
very active on the African continent. Operation Artemis, launched in 2003, was the first 
operation in Africa; its purpose was to help the UN stabilise the security situation in the 
Bunia region of the Democratic Republic of Congo. The EU carried out 18 missions and 
operations (out of a total of 34) in Africa between 2003 and the end of 2015; nine have 
been completed and nine are still ongoing. Africa will remain the EU’s most likely area of 
operations in the future. Numerous factors play a role in this, including its geographical 
proximity and the risk of spill-over effects in Europe (in the shape of terrorism, organised 
crime and migration), concerns about the humanitarian situation, and historical 
ties arising from former colonial relationships. The EU also seems to have sufficient 
legitimacy for such involvement due to the broad nature of its actions.
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Table 1 Completed CSDP missions and operations in Africaa
Mission/operation (country) Type Personnelb Duration
Artemis DR Congo (DRC) Military 1,968c 2003
EUPOL Kinshasa (DRC) Civilian 30 2005–2007
Support to AMIS (Sudan/Darfur) Civilian/military 47 2005–2007
EUFOR DR Congo (DRC) Military 2,300 c 2006
EUPOL DR Congo (DRC) Civilian 31 2007–2014
EUFOR Chad/CAR (Chad/CAR) Military 3,700 2008–2009
EUSSR Guinea-Bissau (Guinea-Bissau) Civilian 8 2008–2010
EUAVSEC South Sudan (South Sudan) Civilian 34 2012–2014
EUFOR CAR (CAR) Military 750d 2014–2015
a) Data obtained from the website of the EEAS, unless otherwise indicated.
b) Maximum strength (planned or realised), international personnel only.
c) Source: SIPRI Multilateral Peace Missions Database
d) Source: Thierry Tardy, EUFOR RCA: tough start, smooth end, European Union Institute for Security Studies, 
Paris, 2015, p. 17
Table 2 Current CSDP missions and operations in Africaa
Mission/operation (country) Type Personnelb Since
EUSEC DRC (DRC) Civilian 40 2005
EUNAVFOR Atalanta (Somalia) Military 1,200 2008
EUTM Somalia (Somalia)c Military 155 2010
EUCAP Nestor (Djibouti, Somalia, Seychelles and Tanzania) Civilian/
military
100 2012
EUCAP Sahel (Niger) Civilian 56 2012
EUTM Mali (Mali) Military 550 2013
EUBAM Libya (Libya)d Civilian 17 2013
EUCAP Sahel (Mali) Civilian 80 2015
EUMAM CAR (CAR) Military 60 2015
a) Data obtained from the website of the EEAS, unless otherwise indicated.
b) Maximum strength (planned or realised), international personnel only.
c) This training mission previously took place largely in Uganda; the headquarters moved to Mogadishu 
(Somalia) in early 2014.
d) This mission was withdrawn to Tunisia in October 2014; personnel numbers indicate current strength.
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The number of missions and operations in Africa has shown an upward overall trend 
since 2003 (see Graph 1). Unlike in other parts of the world, where the EU deploys 
a higher proportion of civilian missions, on the African continent as many military 
operations (8) as civilian ones (8) have been deployed (plus 2 hybrid operations). The 
geographical focus is mainly on the Sahel region and the area to its south (sub-Sahara) 
as far as Central Africa. The EU has deployed missions and operations in the DRC (5, 
including 1 ongoing), Sudan, South Sudan, Chad and the CAR, as well as a small training 
mission in Guinea-Bissau. The EU is also active in the Horn of Africa: since 2008, it 
has patrolled the waters of Somalia as part of the Atalanta anti-piracy operation. This 
operation is complemented by two other CSDP missions: the EU launched a military 
training operation (EUTM Somalia) in Somalia in 2010, and the civilian mission EUCAP 
Nestor in July 2012, intended to strengthen maritime capacity in the region (practically 
speaking, it is a civilian-military mission). In recent years, the EU has also been active 
in Niger, Mali (with both a military and a civilian training mission) and Libya. The most 
recent operation was undertaken in the Central African Republic in March 2015.
The current EU maritime operation in the Mediterranean, EUNAVFOR Sophia, is not 
included on this list, although it is related directly to the spill-over effects of instability in 
North Africa and Libya in particular. This operation is linked closely to European border 
surveillance, and its primary purpose is therefore to reinforce security in Europe. This 
aspect is discussed later in this chapter.
The EU’s military operations are almost always larger in size than its civilian and hybrid 
missions – sometimes significantly larger. Africa is no exception here. Among the largest 
operations have been Operation Artemis and EUFOR Congo: some 2,000 troops were 
deployed on both these operations in Congo. As many as 3,700 troops were deployed 
for EUFOR Chad/CAR. However, the trend in recent years has been for fewer troops 
to be used in EU operations, primarily because the EU is focusing more on training 
and assistance. The latest EU military operation in Africa (EUMAM CAR) involves 60 
troops. Numbers of civilian personnel on missions have been fairly stable over the years, 
although two capacity-building missions (EUCAP Nestor and EUCAP Sahel) have shown 
an upward trend.
The EU’s civilian missions in Africa generally last longer than the military operations (see 
Table 3). The longest mission (EUSEC DRC) has been running for more than ten years, 
but most missions fall into the one-to-five-years category. Of the four completed military 
operations, three lasted less than a year, while the longest (EUFOR Chad/CAR) ran for 
just over a year. These were operations at the higher end of the conflict spectrum, aimed 
at stabilisation and/or serving as a ‘bridge’ for other organisations. They were relatively 
large in size, with between 750 and 3,700 personnel deployed. The two military training 
missions which have been running for some time (EUTM Somalia and EUTM Mali) are 
both fairly small (≤550 personnel) and are situated relatively low down in the spectrum 
of violence. There thus seems to be a correlation between the duration of a CSDP 
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operation and the type of mandate: the operation’s duration is inversely proportional to 
the risk that is taken.77 The only exception to this seems to be Operation Atalanta: this 
has been running for some time, but it is not a training mission and it is fairly robust in 
character. It also remains to be seen whether and how EUMAM CAR fits in with this 
trend; it is a small military training mission and has not yet been running for more than 
a year.
Table 3 Total duration of CSDP missions and operations a
≤ 6 months 6 months 
–1 year
1–5 years 5–10 years ≥10 years
Completed military 
operations 2 1 1
Ongoing military 
operations 1 1 2
Completed civilian 
missions 4 1
Ongoing civilian 
missions 1 3 1
a) The hybrid missions are included in this table under civilian missions.
The EU has carried out many different types of operations and missions in Africa: 
police missions, stabilisation operations, missions focusing on SSR, border surveillance 
missions, and so on. In this sense, the African continent is a kind of testing ground for 
CSDP activities.78 The pattern of the EU’s civilian missions has been consistent: they 
focus mainly on training, education and assistance. Examples include police missions 
(EUPOL Kinshasa and EUPOL DR Congo) and SSR missions (EU SSR Guinea-Bissau, 
EUCAP Sahel Niger). The EU also deploys more specific missions, such as an aviation 
security mission in South Sudan (EUAVSEC South Sudan) and a border surveillance 
mission in Libya (Libya EUBAM).
A slight shift can be detected in the nature of military operations. Previous operations 
were aimed at stabilisation and usually supported other peace operations. For instance, 
Operation Artemis in 2003 was intended to stabilise the security situation before a UN 
peacekeeping force arrived. In the period 2005 to 2007, the EU supported the African 
Union mission in Sudan/Darfur with a hybrid civilian-military mission. Two other past 
operations were also intended to support other peace missions. The purpose of EUFOR 
77 Thierry Tardy, op. cit., p. 134
78 R.G. Whitman, ´The EU and Sub-Saharan Africa’, in: Sven Biscop, R.G. Whitman, The Routledge Handbook of 
European Security, Routledge, London, 2012
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DRC was to support the UN MONUC mission during elections in the country, and 
EUFOR Chad/CAR was intended as a temporary ‘bridging’ operation before the arrival 
of UN troops. Apart from this latter, military operations after 2010 have focused primarily 
on training and advising the security services. The first military training operation was 
launched in Somalia, where the EU has so far trained more than 4,000 Somali soldiers 
under EUTM Somalia. This was followed in 2013 by a similar operation in Mali (EUTM 
Mali) and in 2015 by the military advice operation EUMAM CAR in the Central African 
Republic. These operations very specifically have a training mandate, and exclude 
any form of participation in fighting. The EU has demonstrated its ability to deploy a 
variety of missions and operations in Africa. Capacity-building seems to be playing an 
increasingly central role in both military operations and civilian missions of the CSDP.79 
However, the EU has also shown that it can be flexible in terms of its mandate, and can 
adapt any mission or operation to the specific needs of the country.
The future of the CSDP in Africa
Given the political and social instability in regions such as the Sahel, North Africa and 
the Horn of Africa, the demand for crisis management operations in Africa is expected 
to increase rather than decrease (see Chapter 2). Fragile and failing states pose a 
particular challenge for the EU. Capacity-building will thus continue to play an important 
role in the wider security sector in the future, in particular by means of hybrid (primarily 
SSR) and civilian missions. The emphasis will be on small-scale missions involving 
providing advice at the (senior) management and organisational levels. As well as a 
wide array of instruments (civilian, military and community resources), the EU also has 
extensive experience in this field and is thus well-equipped to carry out this type of 
mission.
Military operations are expected to retain a strong focus on building local capacity 
through training and other forms of support. It is also expected that African 
organisations (such as the AU) and the UN will rely on high-tech niche capabilities 
to fill gaps that non-European troop suppliers are unable to fill.80 The deployment 
of Dutch intelligence capacity in Mali (for MINUSMA) is one example of this. It is 
perfectly possible that the UN may also ask the EU to intervene in situations of serious 
human rights violations, war crimes or humanitarian emergencies. Such operations 
(also referred to as ‘initial entry operations’) will be at the higher end of the violence 
spectrum. The increasing use of heavier weapons, roadside bombs and other means of 
violence (see Chapter 3) will place higher demands on EU military operations. The use of 
79 Thierry Tardy, op. cit., p. 134
80 Luc van der Goor, et al., ‘Peacekeeping operations in a changing world’, in: A world order balancing on the 
brink – Clingendael Strategic Monitor 2014, Clingendael Institute, The Hague, June 2014
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heavier equipment and more fire power will need to be taken into account: both will be 
necessary for escalation dominance. The growing threat of roadside bombs and terrorist 
attacks means that force protection remains a high priority.81
Many of the conflicts in African countries have a complex mix of root causes. 
Addressing such crises therefore requires a long-term approach, as indicated in the 
joint Communication of the High Representative and the Commissionon ‘The EU’s 
comprehensive approach to external conflicts and crises’, issued in late 2013 (see 
Chapter 3). However a long-term approach often begins with the deployment of military 
and civilian CSDP resources, and the continued demand for the deployment of troops, 
police and other civilian actors is at odds with the diminishing willingness of EU member 
states to supply personnel for CSDP operations (especially military personnel). This is 
partly for financial reasons: cuts in defence budgets mean that fewer military capabilities 
are available, and operations cannot be ‘sustained’ for as long. In part, too, there seems 
to be a general ‘intervention fatigue’, which first appeared after EU member states’ 
prolonged involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq.82 A complicating factor here is that 
the circumstances in which operations take place are expected to grow increasingly 
dangerous. As well as entailing ever greater requirements for force protection (even 
for training missions), this raises the fundamental question of whether the EU member 
states are willing to deploy their capabilities on missions at the higher end of the 
spectrum. The EU Battlegroups, the permanent military rapid-reaction units that have 
stood ready since 2007, have not yet been used – despite the need in crisis situations in 
places such as Mali and the Central African Republic for rapid deployment of combat 
troops. Political will is crucial here; this will remain true in the future.
Most conflicts in Africa are not confined within national borders, but are transnational 
in nature. Tackling these crises therefore requires not just a comprehensive approach, 
but a regional one too. The EU recognises this and is attempting to define regional 
integrated strategies (see Chapter 3). For CSDP operations, this raises the question of 
whether military operations and civilian missions must be confined to one country’s 
territory, as is usually the case. Even EUCAP Sahel Niger, originally intended as a 
broader regional mission, now focuses mainly on developing Niger’s security sector.83 
One significant impediment to the more transnational deployment of CSDP operations is 
the UN mandate that is required in the EU to launch military operations. Such mandates 
are confined within the national borders of a sovereign state and thus impede the 
81 See inter al.: Margriet Drent, Rob Hendriks, Dick Zandee, op. cit.
82 Tim Haesebrouck, Melanie Meirvenne, ‘EU-geleide crisismanagement-operaties: minder, kleinschaliger en 
pragmatischer’, Internationale Spectator, Den Haag, december 2013, p. 12
83 Nicoletta Pirozzi, ‘The European Union and Civilian Crisis Management after Lisbon’, European Foreign 
Affairs Review, 2015, p. 300
37
The EU as a security actor in Africa | December 2015
organisation of transnational crisis management operations within a broader regional 
approach.
Because of the danger of spill-over effects, the EU is developing a growing number 
of activities focusing on internal security, such as counter-terrorism and border 
surveillance. External security (causes) and internal security (impacts) come together in 
such operations.84 Mandates for external (CSDP) operations are influenced increasingly 
by internal security objectives. The military training operation EUTM Mali has as an 
explicit objective to “neutralise organised crime and terrorist threats”.85 The fight against 
terrorism is identified as one of the objectives in the mandate of EUCAP Sahel Niger. 
In its recently-formulated Sahel Regional Action Plan, the EU emphasised increasing 
security by combating terrorism, trafficking, radicalisation and violent extremism. 
Accordingly, the Council decided to strengthen the EUCAP Sahel Niger mission to 
prevent illegal immigration and reduce related criminality.86 Another clear example is the 
EUBAM Libya mission, which aims to counter illegal migration into Europe by helping 
the Libyan authorities secure the country’s borders. In itself it is understandable that 
the EU should place more emphasis on security objectives, if only in an attempt to 
increase member states’ willingness to participate in missions. At the same time, care 
must be taken to ensure that these targets are not over-prioritised, as this may provoke 
mistrust on the part of the host state and cause it to refuse further cooperation, making 
it impossible to undertake or continue the mission.
For the EU, the importance of collaboration with regional and sub-regional organisations 
such as ECOWAS and the AU is increasing. The aim is to put these organisations in 
a better position to prevent and manage crises in the region themselves. As noted 
previously in the Clingendael Monitor 2014 in-depth study, Peace operations in a 
changing world, a certain division of labour seems to have arisen by which African 
partners provide ‘boots on the ground’, while the EU supplies mainly temporary and 
supplementary special capabilities.87 However, working with African partners is not 
without its problems, as noted in previous chapters. Firstly, it creates political problems, 
because intervention by neighbouring countries undermines the mission’s neutrality 
and often makes conflict situations even more complex. Secondly, there are practical 
problems associated with inadequate basic equipment and funding of missions. Apart 
from this, there is also criticism of the outsourcing model in principle. Given the current 
threats that the EU faces and which originate partly on the African continent, the EU 
84 For a detailed discussion of this, see: Dick Zandee et al., ‘The relationship between external and internal 
security’, in: Jan Rood et al., A world order balancing on the brink – Clingendael Strategic Monitor 2014, 
Clingendael Institute, The Hague, June 2014, pp. 69-140.
85 EUTM Mali, EEAS, 2015, http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eutm-mali/index_en.htm. 
86 EUCAP Sahel Niger to help prevent irregular migration, Council of the European Union, May 2015
87 Luc van der Goor et al., op. cit. 
38
The EU as a security actor in Africa | December 2015
should be prepared to make more of a contribution itself, either by carrying out its own 
missions in times of crisis, or by forming a serious partnership with these sub-regional 
organisations that goes beyond financial support.88
Cooperation: problems and improvements
The comprehensive approach outlined in Chapter 3 requires deepening cooperation 
between all relevant EU actors, inside and outside the CSDP. Four areas can be 
distinguished here: cooperation between the operational level (‘the field’) and the 
strategic level (Brussels); interaction between the different European actors themselves; 
the planning and control of CSDP operations; and, finally, the consequences of the 
increasing intertwining of external and internal security.
Cooperation between ‘the field’ and Brussels
The EU has made progress in this area in recent years (see Chapter 3), and the 
CSDP has reaped the benefits of this. Thus coordination has improved between EU 
Delegations, which play an important role in conflict prevention, early warning and crisis 
response, and CSDP actors. Most CSDP missions in Africa have a liaison officer in the 
EU Delegations. This method of coordination enhances the functioning of a mission such 
as EUCAP Sahel Niger, where there is close cooperation between the EU Delegation 
and the mission. In some cases, however, cooperation has been inadequate, such as 
EUAVSEC South Sudan.89 The Delegations in general contend with a lack of resources 
and staff, and are very dependent operationally on the Head of Delegation (HoD). 
Specifically in the African context, there is also a lack of expertise in the security-
development nexus, which makes it hard to implement the comprehensive approach. 
This could be improved considerably by increasing and enhancing cooperation with 
the EU Special Representatives and Brussels, and in particular with DG DEVCO, but 
such cooperation remains difficult (see Chapter 3). It would also be good to have more 
specific military expertise in EU Delegations, for example in the form of permanent 
military attachés.90
Interaction between EU actors
The EU Special Representatives contribute to the EU’s visibility in the world and act as 
‘eyes and ears’ for the European institutions in crisis regions such as the Horn of Africa 
88 R. Gowan, N. Witney, Why Europe must stop outsourcing its security, European Council of Foreign Relations, 
London, 2014
89 Nicoletta Pirozzi, op. cit. 
90 Damien Helly, Greta Galeazzi, op. cit., p. 70
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and the Sahel. They are also expected to contribute to the coordination between the 
different EU actors in the field, including CSDP actors. The SRs were previously largely 
integrated into the command structure of civilian CSDP missions, with the Head of 
Mission reporting to the SR. Now their role is more limited to giving political advice to 
the leadership of both missions and operations.91 Coordination between the different 
EU institutions has proved difficult, because the SRs have no formal competence for 
the activities of the EEAS and the Commission. In the case of the Sahel, this has led to 
frictions between the EUSR and the EEAS Sahel coordinator.92 As stated, cooperation 
between the EU Delegations and the SRs is also limited. Improved cooperation and 
a clearer positioning of the EUSRs relative to the EEAS and other actors would help 
increase the added value of the EUSRs.
In Brussels, new mechanisms such as the Crisis Management Board and the Crisis 
Platform have improved cooperation between the various crisis management actors, but 
have not been able to overcome the structural barriers between EU institutions. The ad 
hoc use of the Crisis Platform makes the transition more difficult between the short-term 
crisis response of the CSDP structures and the Commission’s long-term activities.93
Civilian-military headquarters
At the Brussels level, lack of inter-institutional cooperation is still one of the biggest 
obstacles to the comprehensive approach (see Chapter 3). Internal cooperation is also 
difficult within the CSDP structures themselves however, particularly between CMPD 
and CPCC in the planning phase. This hinders the rapid launch of missions in Africa.94 
The solution lies in integrating planning and control capabilities by housing all existing 
structures in a permanent EU Operation Headquarters (OHQ) in Brussels.95 Such a 
headquarters, consisting of civilian and military departments under the same roof, 
could ensure that military operations and civilian missions are aligned closely from 
the initial planning stage onwards.96 The United Kingdom’s contention that this would 
91 Dominik Tolksdorf, ‘Diplomacy at the Individual Level: The Role of the EU Special Representatives in 
European Foreign Policy’, in: J. A. Koops, G Macaj, The EU as a diplomatic actor, Palgrave Macmillan, 
London, 2015
92 Nicole Koenig, Resetting EU External Action: Potential and Constraints, Jacques Delors Institut, Berlin, 
2015, p. 125
93 Ibid.
94 Nicoletta Pirozzi, op. cit. 
95 Margriet Drent, Dick Zandee, Breaking Pillars – Towards a civil-military security approach for the European 
Union, Clingendael Institute, The Hague, 2010
96 In addition to the existing CPCC there would then need to be a Military Planning and Conduct Capability. 
See: Margriet Drent, Dick Zandee, Eva Maas, Defence matters: more urgent than ever, Clingendael Institute, 
The Hague, 2015 
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duplicate NATO structures is no longer valid, since the point here would be specifically 
to strengthen the comprehensive approach, for which the EU has the comparative 
advantage of its own deployment of both military and civilian resources.
The external-internal security nexus
Recognition of the existence of the internal-external security nexus has intensified 
cooperation between the CSDP and Freedom-Security and Justice (FSJ) actors. This 
became very visible in 2015 with the launch of the CSDP EUNAVFOR Mediterranean 
operation, which aims to counter human smuggling and human trafficking from Libya 
to Europe. The first phase, which began on 22 June 2015, focused on identifying 
and monitoring criminal networks and trafficking patterns. In the second phase, 
authorisation has been given to investigate and seize smugglers’ boats. With the start of 
the second phase, the name of the operation changed to EUNAVFOR Sophia. With this 
military operation, the CSDP instrument is now also being used to address the direct 
effects of instability in Africa. This has also cast civilian-military cooperation in a new 
light. Whereas in the past this meant cooperation between military and civilian actors in 
crisis areas, it is now also about concrete interaction between military CSDP actors and 
civil actors in the FSJ area. Operation Sophia is working very closely with the Frontex 
operation Triton.97 This operation puts the CSDP at the interface between external and 
internal security.98
Cooperation with European agencies is also becoming more common in the traditional 
CSDP missions and operations. In the African context, the close involvement of Frontex 
during both the planning and implementation stages of EUBAM Libya can be cited 
as an example. Cooperation also takes place with Interpol, for instance in the case 
of EUNAVFOR Atalanta; data collected during the mission is distributed via Interpol 
channels. Cooperation with Europol has been on a smaller scale so far: initial steps 
have been taken, but not yet in Africa. CSDP missions would benefit from cooperation 
with this agency, especially for information exchange. Given the current refugee and 
migration crisis in Europe, in which many of the migrants come from African countries, 
further involvement of agencies (in particular Frontex) is very likely.
97 Both operational headquarters are located at the Italian command centre in Santa Rosa (near Rome); 
information is shared and there is cooperation on rescue operations.
98 EU’s naval mission in Mediterranean sets precedents, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 
October 2015
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Finally
Both the changing conflict situations in Africa and the comprehensive approach affect 
the capabilities being requested from EU member states. Instability on the continent 
will increase the demand for EU crisis management operations. Initially, this will consist 
mainly of capacity-building missions, but the question is whether this will be enough. As 
conflicts become more violent, this will require other capabilities from the EU – either 
to be deployed independently or as niche support for other actors such as the AU or 
the UN. Calls for the deployment of EU Battlegroups in initial entry situations and as a 
bridge to a broader African or UN operation may grow louder. What is certain is that the 
complexity of conflicts’ root causes and their transnational nature require an integrated, 
regional approach. To an increasing degree, operations related to the EU’s internal 
security form part of this approach. All this has consequences for the military power 
of European countries, which will be called upon more frequently, especially for use in 
hybrid and civilian missions. A comprehensive approach also requires a high level of 
cooperation, both between the field and the EU institutions, and between the different 
actors in Brussels. It is the joint responsibility of EU member states and EU institutions to 
implement the comprehensive approach effectively, and thus contribute to stability and 
security in Africa.
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5 Conclusions
Africa as a continent of conflict
1. Africa remains the most unstable continent. Conflicts continue to proliferate, and many 
countries in the Horn of Africa, the Sahel and sub-Saharan Africa are failing to make 
the transition to minimal stability.
2. Causes of conflicts often lie in a complex mix of underdevelopment, patrimonial state 
structures, fragmented societies, regional factors and demographics.
3. Religious radicalisation associated with political violence and terrorism has spread from 
North Africa via the Sahel to sub-Saharan Africa. A less well-known development is the 
emergence of new Christian movements that are forming ties with (autocratic) political 
forces and offering social support for radical (Christian) youth.
4. Instability in large parts of Africa is reinforcing the proliferation of weapons. 
The intensity of violence is increasing. Roadside bombs (improvised explosive devices) 
in particular are claiming increasing numbers of victims.
5. International involvement in the form of interventions and peacekeeping is 
characterised by a patchwork of operations by the UN, the EU, African organisations 
and individual countries. Operationally, more attention is now being paid to countering 
religious radicalisation and terrorism (at the expense of stabilisation and normalisation).
6. African countries are supplying a growing proportion of international peacekeeping 
missions, but this brings new problems with it because of the national political, 
economic and financial interests involved. Moreover, there is a twilight zone of purely 
national interventions, especially in immediately neighbouring countries.
7. African economies have stagnated due to their reliance on commodity exports, which 
means that developments on the global market affect Africa directly. Too little effort 
is being made to improve sectors that will reinforce the economy structurally, such as 
transport, infrastructure and education.
8. The population of Africa is the fastest-growing in the world, from 1.2 billion today to 
2.5 billion in 2050. The rate of increase is fastest in the Sahel region. These demo-
graphic developments are creating major problems for young people, regardless of 
educational level, who have little prospect of employment.
9. Democratisation and good governance programmes have produced very little. 
Presidential power structures and corruption usually remain prevalent. Elections are not 
generally followed by reforms and administrative changes.
10. Outside the expanding conflict zone (North Africa, Sahel, immediately sub-Saharan 
Africa), political tensions elsewhere on the continent are mounting. In Central Africa 
(DRC, Burundi), the cause lies in weak states and tense ethnic relations. In Southern 
Africa, socio-economic factors are more responsible for the growing (internal) 
instability.
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11. The EU must take the growing influence of other actors in Africa (China, India, Brazil, 
USA) into account. However, developments in Africa will continue to affect Europe. 
The approach requires close EU cooperation with African actors, with economic 
growth and development as the key to achieving more stability and reversing the 
increase in migration and terrorism.
The EU’s comprehensive approach
12. The EU High Representative/European External Action Service, the European 
Commission and the EU Council of Ministers have fleshed out the comprehensive 
approach with new coordination mechanisms and consultation processes. These 
are based on a systematic and pragmatic approach in which the various policy 
instruments are used in a flexible, tailor-made fashion.
13. The operational translation of this innovative approach to all levels of intra- and 
inter-institutional cooperation is proceeding with more difficulty, however. The 
principles and structures of integrated cooperation have not yet penetrated the 
various departments of the EEAS, the Commission and Council sufficiently. In the 
field, both EU Special Representatives and EU Delegations lack knowledge of, and 
expertise in, all components of the array of EU instruments.
14. Integrating the Common Security and Defence Policy into the EU’s comprehensive 
approach is also proving difficult. Moreover, (civilian) EU missions are entering the 
field of training and capacity-building increasingly, so that the CSDP is straying 
frequently into the territory of projects managed by the Commission.
15. One hopeful sign is the commitment of the HR and the Commission to review 
progress on the comprehensive approach, and to engage in streamlining annually. 
Current efforts are directed primarily at aligning the CSDP and development 
cooperation more closely together, among other means by aligning both areas with 
capacity-building for security and development (an extension of Train and Equip). 
Under this heading, ways are currently being considered of extending the often-
limited external financing instruments managed by the Commission and making 
them more readily available for support to CSDP missions and operations.
16. Far greater use needs to be made of the CSDP to support EU transition strategies 
with a longer timeframe. Thus the CSDP’s exit planning should be linked explicitly to 
the use of instruments focusing on the transition to sustainable peace in the longer 
term. The Sahel and Somalia are important testing grounds for this.
17. The new strategy for foreign and security policy, to be submitted to the European 
Council in June 2016, has the potential to make an important contribution by setting 
the overall direction for the cooperation processes of the comprehensive approach.
18. The EU’s comprehensive approach has considerable potential, but success will 
depend primarily on maximising interaction between departments, institutions and 
member states, which may in turn increase mutual understanding, trust and the 
exchange of expertise.
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19. Africa remains the most likely area of operations for the CSDP. Demand for European 
crisis management operations will increase further, with greater emphasis on 
capacity-building in the wider security sector, especially with civilian-military 
(hybrid) and civilian missions.
20. Military operations will also focus primarily on training and education in order to 
strengthen local military capabilities. Additionally, African organisations and the EU 
continue to rely on European niche capabilities such as high-quality intelligence.
21. European countries must also consider intervening at the higher end of the spectrum 
in acute crises. Generally, the increasing use and intensity of violence in Africa is 
placing higher demands on the use of EU military resources. Political will evidently 
remain the crucial criterion for deployment of such capabilities (such as the EU 
Battlegroups).
22. The cross-frontier nature of conflicts in Africa raises questions about the 
effectiveness of UN and other mandates and CSDP and other operations being 
confined to the territory of individual states.
23. Strengthening relations between the field and Brussels requires closer cooperation 
between Brussels CSDP structures, EU Delegations and Special Representatives. 
Appointments of military liaison officers can help ensure this.
24. EU Special Representatives have an important role to play in strengthening 
interaction between all EU actors in the field, but they must obtain additional powers 
and capabilities in order to do this.
25. At the strategic level in Brussels, the comprehensive approach requires the 
establishment of a Civilian-Military Operation Headquarters to ensure close 
alignment of the EU’s array of instruments in the planning phase and in the direction 
of operations. In addition to the existing Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability, a 
Military Planning and Conduct Capability would need to be created; the two would 
be accommodated together in the Civilian-Military Headquarters.
26. The close relationship between external and internal security has become very 
apparent with the exponential growth of migration flows towards Europe from Africa 
and the Middle East. This has implications for the CSDP, which is becoming more 
explicitly connected (in terms of mandates and activities) with ‘internal’ security 
issues such as border surveillance.
